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O
n 14 March 2016, Russian
President Vladimir Putin
suddenly declared that his
country was withdrawing ‘most’ of its
forces from Syria, following thousands of
air strikes in support of the Syrian regime
and its Iranian, Hizbullah, Iraqi, Pakistani
and Afghan allies. The announcement
brought yet another phase in Syria’s five-
year conflict to an end; however, as with
the previous phases, it has not heralded
any advance towards a resolution of the
crisis.
Instead, the Russian intervention
contributed to a consolidation of space
in which leading Syria-based actors – the
regime of President Bashar Al-Assad, the
opposition rebel bloc: and the Kurdish
movement (dominated at this point by
the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union
Party, PYD, and its militia, known as
the People’s Protection Units, YPG) –
exercised and entrenched their authority
locally. This occurred alongside efforts
which were nominally concentrated
on diminishing the power of the other
two actors, Daesh (also known as the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) and
the Al-Qa’ida-affiliated Jabhat Al-Nusra.
This consolidation has been helped along
by the support that the opposition rebel
bloc receives (primarily from Saudi Arabia
and other Gulf States), a partial ceasefire
that has been in place since 27 February
2016 and several rounds of negotiations
in Geneva.
At the time of writing, the ceasefire
between rebels, the Syrian military and
the Assad regime’s external allied forces
(Russia, Hizbullah, Iran, and Iraqi and
Afghan militias) is breaking down in
northwest Syria, notably near Aleppo
and in the coastal Latakia province. At
the same time, Kurdish YPG fighters are
attempting to take territory from the
rebels, while fighting has also continued
between Daesh and rebels in northern
Syria near the Turkish border. None of
these contests are likely to conclude
with a decisive military victory for any
side. The situation in Syria is thus one
characterised by a political and military
stalemate and de facto partition. As the
prospects of moving beyond this status
quo in the near future are limited, a
further consolidation of the various
front lines between regime, Kurdish and
opposition forces is more likely to offer a
stabilisation of the situation across much
of Syria.
This analysis does not, in line
with most of the literature on civil war
settlement,
1
advocate the partition of
Syria as a long-term solution to the
country’s ongoing conflict. However,
equally one cannot rule out that such
partition – de facto or de jure – will
be the eventual outcome of a civil war
now in its sixth year. Therefore, the
question this article addresses is not
what a comprehensive and sustainable
settlement of the conflict may look like in
the future, but rather how to connect the
legitimacy recently conferred on various
Syrian actors by the Geneva negotiations
and other international discussions to
existing and future local arrangements
establishing stability and security on the
ground. These, in turn, are necessary
conditions for a credible and sustainable
transition from the current civil war.
Arrangements put in place now for
governance, reconstruction, provision
of services, justice and civic engagement
sYRIa: laYIng ThE FOunDaTIOns
FOR a cREDIBlE anD susTaInaBlE
TRansITIOn
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Despite its extreme fragility, the ceasefire in place in Syria since February 2016 has
afforded the opportunity to assess the options for a set of interim governance and
transitional justice arrangements. These could establish the foundations for a transition
following the conclusion of the Syrian civil war, regardless of its endpoint. Drawing on
the specifics of the Syrian case and wider studies of interventions in, and transitions
from, civil war, Scott Lucas, Christalla Yakinthou and Stefan Wolff consider the challenges
of peace- and state-building, identifying both risks and mitigating actions. The article
argues that risk mitigation is possible and should begin now. These efforts need to be
supported by the international community in order to lay the foundations for a credible
and sustainable post-civil war transition in Syria.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as
Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
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RUSI 161_3 Text.indd 22 15/06/2016 10:44:23
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 05
:36
 13
 Ju
ly 
20
16
 
23
will lay the foundation for, and shape the
direction of, the political, legal, economic
and social constructions that will be
necessary if there is ever again to be a
meaningful ‘Syria’ in the sense of a single
state, or even if several entities emerge
in the aftermath of the civil war. These
arrangements must be made now, rather
than waiting for a terminal moment
in the conflict. They must be based on
recognition of the necessity of a ‘bottom-
up’ approach, establishing connections
with local groups rather than imposing
a preconceived international model of
the proper, ‘moderate’ procedures and
actors.
2
It is against this background that
this article assesses the options of an
interim system which – following the
declaration of a cessation of hostilities
– could establish the foundations for
a subsequent transition, regardless of
its endpoint. Thus, this analysis begins
from the ground up, rather than from
a top-down projection of ‘Syria’ from
the outside. Drawing on the specifics of
the Syrian case and the wider studies of
interventions in, and transitions from, civil
war,
3
the article considers the challenges
of peace- and state-building, and of
transitional justice, identifying both risks
and mitigating actions.
4
The key point
here is that risk mitigation needs to begin
now – and it needs to start with a sober
analysis of the realities on the ground,
rather than with the types of wishful,
evasive and hyperbolic thinking that
has characterised so much of Western
intervention for more than a decade.
This article sits alongside efforts
such as those of James Dobbins, Philip
Gordon and Jeffrey Martini.
5
It echoes
US President Barack Obama’s call for
suggestions which respond to the
question: ‘[S]pecifically, precisely, what
exactly would you do, and how would
you fund it, and how would you sustain
it?’
6
The aforementioned analysts
focus on the creation of safe zones, the
partition of territory with international
guarantors of the respective regime,
opposition and Kurdish areas, prisoner
releases, humanitarian deliveries and
a co-operative destruction of Daesh. In
contrast, this examination focuses on
the governance and transitional justice
arrangements needed for a credible and
sustainable post-civil war transition in
Syria that can and should be supported
by the international community now.
The next section offers a conceptual
framework for the argument, drawing on
existing literature on conflict settlement
and post-civil war transitions. It makes
use of a wide range of open-source data
and it then offers a brief chronological
narrative of the developing crisis in Syria.
This forms the empirical basis for the
subsequent analysis of the requirements
for a credible and sustainable post-
civil war transition in Syria and how
steps taken now by the international
community can contribute to laying
these foundations. The article concludes
with some brief policy recommendations
embedded in an assessment of the
benefits and shortcomings of the
proposal.
Preparing the Ground for Post-
Civil War Transitions
There is broad agreement in the
literature on civil war settlements that
the success of war-to-peace transitions
Syrian Kurdish refugees at a refugee camp in Suruc, on the Turkey–Syria border, October 2014. Courtesy of AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis.
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is dependent on a number of factors,
many of which are beyond the control
of external actors whose engagement is
nevertheless often critical to success.
7
Among those factors that are, at least
partially, under the control of domestic
and external actors is the design of
post-civil war institutions: that is, the
negotiated (or at times imposed) rules
of the political game after the civil war
concerning the forms of representation
and participation (or exclusion) of
different actors, and the distribution of
power and resources among them.
8
From
this perspective, transitions from civil war
are often exercises in both peace-building
and state-building,
9
which require a
thorough analysis of the underlying
conflict (including the causes of its onset
and persistence).
10
Most of the literature on conflict
settlement and post-civil war transitions
is focused on building democratic states.
This is primarily based on the assumption
that democracy in itself is a form of
conflict settlement and helps to prevent
conflict recurrence,
11
despite significant
theoretical arguments and growing
empirical evidence to the contrary.
12
Several recent studies emphasise the
importance of local conditions to the
success of democratic state-building
after civil war, as caution against over-
confident external democracy-builders
that lack strong and committed local
partners whom they can support.
13
Timothy D Sisk, in his account of the
dilemmas of power-sharing in the Syrian
civil war and more generally, has argued
persuasively for ‘the need for scholars to
develop more contingent- and context-
specific knowledge’ if academic research
is to make a meaningful contribution to
policy.
14
Thus, there is first of all a need for
an approach that starts with a thorough
assessment of the situation in Syria as it
is, rather than what observers might wish
it to be. The following section offers such
an assessment, albeit with the caveat
that the situation in Syria and the region
more broadly remains highly fluid.
Second, while ‘models’ of post-civil
war transitions, both in terms of the
transition process and its substantive
outcomes, are certainly limited in their
transferability from one situation to
another, there are nonetheless some
useful parallels that can be drawn from
similar transitions in the past. Moreover,
based on an analysis of conditions
on the ground in Syria, such models
can be adapted in order to establish
some contingent predictions on likely
trajectories of a post-civil war transition
in the country. Predominantly, this is
about lessons learned over time.
Third, the authors’ own past
research has generally confirmed the
significance of domestic factors, and in
particular the role of local leadership, in
the success of war-to-peace transitions.
These domestic factors can be shaped
and success can ultimately be facilitated
through a combination of institutional
design and international diplomacy
that enables local leaders to build on
and leverage a shared commitment to
peace.
15
Taking the second and third points
together, the current situation of relative
stalemate and de facto partition can be
used productively to shape the domestic
conditions that will eventually create
the foundations on which a post-civil
war transition in Syria will be built. This
article focuses on two areas of particular
importance: future governance structures
and transitional justice mechanisms for
dealing with the conflict’s legacy. These
are not opportunistically chosen issues;
instead, they reflect an established
consensus on the importance of
institutional design and the role that
external actors play in its negotiation,
16
as well as on the need to reckon with the
legacy of conflict-related violence in order
to (re-)establish trust in those institutions.
This, in turn, shapes a number of policy-
relevant conclusions – not in terms of
the design of any particular outcome of
a post-civil war transition in Syria, but of
the steps that can and should be taken
now by the international community to
make a credible and sustainable transition
possible.
Syria’s De Facto Partition: Local
Dynamics and External Agendas
From its very beginning in 2011, the
dynamics of Syria’s civil war have been
shaped simultaneously by local factors,
and the agendas of external regional
players (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the Gulf
States) as well as other global actors
(the US and Russia). Overall, political
conditions were characterised by failed
attempts to broker political solutions
externally under UN mediation and a
highly fragmented and localised spectrum
of armed opposition movements unable
to form or sustain a common platform.
Militarily, the overall trajectory has been
one of regime contraction, the initial
expansion of Daesh after summer 2014
and increasing territorial control of a
wide range of anti-Assad forces, albeit
accompanied by significant in-fighting
among various groups in the opposition
spectrum.
Until the summer of 2014, external
military intervention was relatively
limited and consisted of Western and
Gulf Cooperation Council support of
the opposition in the form of training
and equipment. Similar Russian and
Iranian support was given to the regime,
complemented by a larger number of
military advisers, as well as fighters
provided by Hizbullah, Iraqi and Afghan
militias, and the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard which supported the Syrian army.
This changed in late 2014. The
US-led coalition began operations against
Daesh following its expansion in Iraq
and northern Syria, which included an
offensive which threatened the Kurdish
centre of Kobane on the Turkish border.
Even more significant was the backing of
rebel factions by Gulf States. Reorganised
in blocs such as Jaish Al-Fatah and the
Southern Front, the groups advanced
against the Syrian military in both the
northwest and the south. As Assad’s
position became more and more
precarious over the course of 2015, due
to rebel victories and simultaneous Daesh
offensives in the northeast and the centre
of Syria, Russia decided to intervene
with a two-pronged strategy of military
intervention and diplomatic initiatives.
17
On the diplomatic front, Moscow
led efforts for international discussions
on a ‘political transition’, but without a
specific requirement for the departure
of Assad. This initial diplomatic effort
was frustrated by Saudi Arabia, which
embarrassed Russia by bluntly declaring
at a Moscow press conference in
mid-2015 that Assad’s removal was a
prerequisite for negotiations. However,
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Russia’s simultaneous build-up of military
assets, particularly warplanes, at a base
in western Syria and the beginning of air
strikes on 30 September fundamentally
altered the political dynamics. The US,
European states and even Turkey – a
leading backer of the Syrian opposition
– accepted that Assad could remain
in power for at least six months while
talks developed. Some US analysts and
politicians went even further, saying that
Washington now had to co-operate with
the regime, even if it was responsible for
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of
Syrians.
18
Meanwhile, the Russian military
effort began to have an impact on the
battlefield, consolidating and enhancing
these political and diplomatic gains.
Advanced battlefield equipment,
hundreds of ‘advisers’ including special
forces and spotters for aerial operations,
and thousands of sorties – more than
80 per cent of which extended into
opposition areas – supported ground
offensives on six fronts by the Syrian
military, Iranian commanders and
troops, Hizbullah units and other
foreign militias, particularly from Iraq
and Afghanistan. The offensives initially
struggled; however, by the end of 2015,
they had stabilised Assad’s defence lines
from western Syria to Damascus. The
attacks also began to erode rebel control
in parts of northern and southern Syria,
retaking almost all of Latakia province
and achieving further, if limited, gains
near Aleppo and south of Damascus.
19
The Russian intervention thus
succeeded in its immediate aim of saving
the Assad regime from military collapse.
Yet, by consolidating Assad’s position on
the ground – and thus, in effect, creating
a military stalemate – and by contributing
to the resumption of the political process
in Geneva, Russia’s intervention has led to
the entrenchment of a de facto territorial
partition of Syria. This in turn has created,
and partly legitimised, the forces in
control of those areas and has opened
up political space for other groups,
including the regime’s opponents.
20
As
these still-fragmented groups seek to
find ways to govern the territories they
occupy and to engage in broader political
discussions with the regime through the
UN-mediated Geneva process,
21
external
actors have an opportunity to contribute
to laying the foundations of an eventual
post-civil war transition by strengthening
and supporting some of the local
initiatives that have emerged.
Given the domestic and
international consensus that there will be
no place for Daesh and Jabhat Al-Nusra in
post-civil war Syria, the focus of Western
actors and their regional allies needs to
be on their non-regime partners in Syria:
the Kurdish movement and the broader
opposition rebel bloc. Therefore, the
remainder of this section focuses on
tracing the events and processes through
which, over the past eighteen months,
both of these actors have come to occupy
their current position.
Syria’s Kurdish movement,
specifically the PYD and the YPG, has
both benefited from, and caused,
regional schisms. The Kurdish movement
began to receive US assistance, including
aerial intervention, in 2014, in order to
prevent Daesh’s takeover of Kobane, the
centre of a Kurdish canton on the Turkish
border. However, Moscow’s entry into the
conflict, as well as the failure of a high-
profile $500 million ‘train-and-equip’
programme for rebels, prompted the US
to incorporate this support for Kurdish
factions into a new strategy. Rather than
continuing the ill-fated train-and-equip
programme and other forms of military
support for various rebel factions,
Washington encouraged the formation
of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),
led by the YPG with a token inclusion of
Arab and Assyrian units, to fight Daesh –
even though Turkey believes the Turkish
insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
is directing the PYD and its militia.
22
As Washington supplied arms,
ammunition, special forces and air cover,
the SDF advanced against Daesh in
eastern and northern Syria. In December,
the forces captured the Tishreen Dam
and, despite a Turkish ‘red line’, crossed
to the western bank of the Euphrates
River. This caused considerable anxiety
within the Turkish government and
arguably triggered the subsequent
escalation of hostilities with the PKK in
Turkey’s southeast. Discussions between
Washington and Ankara maintained an
uneasy balance between US support for
the SDF, including the formal deployment
of more special forces in April 2016, and
Turkey’s promotion of a ‘safe zone’ in
northern Syria along the border.
That balance was further threatened
by the YPG’s launch of a new front, with
attacks on rebels in northwest Syria, in
January. The Kurdish forces, supported
in some cases by Russian air strikes,
seized towns and villages near the
Turkish border as well as the Menagh
Air Base. Although Turkey intervened
with shelling in order to check the YPG’s
assault on the important border town of
Azaz, the offensive raised the prospect
of the Afrin canton in northwest Syria
being linked with the Kobane and Cezire
cantons in the northeast, thus creating
a contiguous area under Kurdish control
along the Turkish border which would be
connected to the neighbouring Kurdistan
region of Iraq. The cessation of hostilities
on 27 February has limited this battle,
but the conflict continues in sections
of Aleppo city, along key supply routes
and in Kurdish-occupied towns near the
Turkish border.
Alongside a strengthened military
position, the PYD sought, with
Russian backing, to enter the political
negotiations. The effort appeared to
have paid off with a possible invitation
from UN envoy Staffan de Mistura to join
talks in Geneva at the end of January
2016; however, it was blunted by Turkish
objections and threats to boycott the
process, and de Mistura subsequently
denied that any approach had been
made. Russia’s inclusion of PYD co-leader,
Salih Muslim, on an alternative, fifteen-
name list to the opposition rebel bloc
also had little effect – other Kurdish
groups objected to the PYD’s claim to be
representative of Syrian Kurdistan.
23
Viewed through Washington’s
prism of a Daesh-first strategy, support
of the SDF has been a partial, short-
term response to the accusation that
the US and its allies cannot pursue
an effective intervention in the Syrian
conflict. However, the PYD and YPG are
not recognised as the unquestioned
leaders of the Kurdish movement, as the
dispute over representation at Geneva
showed. Furthermore, the short-term
accommodation between Turkey and the
US is unlikely to continue, especially if the
PYD expands its political control and the
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YPG continues offensives in northwest
Syria.
24
Most importantly, the strategy
does not address the central, continuing
dimension of the civil war, which is the
deadly fight for authority between the
Assad regime, the Syrian opposition and
the rebels. While the opposition rebel
bloc has been plagued by a high degree
of fragmentation and localisation since
the beginning of the war in 2011, it is
still the central actor on a national scale
in the political and military contest for
legitimacy.
Until late 2015, the movement
continued to struggle for coherence
and a unified political leadership, but
the Russian initiative for political talks in
the autumn of 2015, and its acceptance
by the US, forced the different factions
to reconsider their positions. This was
encouraged by Saudi Arabia, whose
support had become even more
important as Washington began looking
to Kurdish groups as an increasingly vital,
and more reliable, ally inside Syria. By
mid-December 2015, opposition political
movements and rebel forces agreed
to a 33-member High Negotiations
Committee, with former Prime Minister
Riyad Hijab as co-ordinator. Jaish Al-Islam,
the main rebel faction near Damascus,
joined the committee. Ahrar Al-Sham, the
largest rebel group, initially signed the
document, although it stepped back amid
internal debates among its leadership and
took on the role of interested observer of
the Geneva talks.
25
This high-level realignment has
intersected with the development
of local opposition rebel institutions
that started earlier in 2015 amid the
takeover of territory in areas such as
Idlib province. Local committees have
taken on the challenges of security,
governance, systems of justice, repair of
infrastructure and provision of services.
Factions, including Ahrar Al-Sham, have
begun to distance themselves from the
problematic Jabhat Al-Nusra, even as
they co-operate with the jihadist group
in some battles.
The developing Kurdish and
opposition rebel movements cannot
create the conditions for a long-term
settlement. In part, this is because
of the conflicting demands of the
two sides, but it is also because of
the immovable obstacle of the Assad
regime’s conditions for negotiating an
agreement. Damascus has ruled out
Kurdish autonomy in a ‘federal’ Syria,
even though the regime’s ally, Russia, put
forth the idea in February 2016. President
Assad, in effect, pre-empted the Geneva
negotiations in late March when he said
that he would never accept a transitional
governing authority, the central element
of international proposals in the period
since June 2012. His position was
reinforced at the subsequent talks by
the regime delegation’s refusal of any
negotiations over the president’s future.
26
However, if the prospects of
inclusive negotiations and constructive
engagement in Geneva – let alone of
any significant breakthrough – remain
slim, the territorial and partial political
consolidation among non-regime
movements offers possibilities for an
eventual transition. Kurdish political
and military success against Daesh
has buttressed de facto legitimacy as
the authority in much of northeastern
Syria, although this position remains
somewhat tenuous, both in cities of
divided control, such as Qamishli,
and in relation to the rebels over
attempts to join the Kurdish-dominated
northwestern and northeastern cantons.
The opposition rebel movement – having
withstood bombing by both the regime
and Russia, increased intervention on
the ground by Iran, Hizbullah and other
foreign fighters, protracted sieges,
and attacks by the YPG and Daesh
– can consequently claim a political
space which is unlikely to disappear.
This is most obviously the case in Idlib
province, but will require externally
facilitated local agreements in still-
contested spaces in the divided city of
Aleppo and the Damascus suburbs.
The key point here is about the
existence of relatively consolidated local
spaces, occupied by political actors that
are potential partners for the West and
its regional partners, now and in an
eventual post-civil war transition. Such
potential partners are needed regardless
of whether Syria’s current de facto
partition is overcome in the context of
a national solution or becomes more
permanent in the longer term. The
emergence of these spaces and actors
presents an opportunity for engagement
and for strengthening and supporting
local initiatives that can critically shape
the nature and direction of a future
transition. The different options available
to the West and its partners in this
context are the focus of the following
sections.
Post-Civil War Governance
Arrangements in Syria: What to
Expect and How to Prepare
Based on this article’s analysis so far, it
is possible to make some reasonable
assumptions about different options
and about the process and substance of
a post-civil war transition in Syria. Once
these are established, it is also possible to
identify the key risks such options entail
and to consider actions to mitigate those
risks, laying the foundations of a credible
and sustainable transition. To do this,
this section first summarises the current
state of affairs in Syria (as of May 2016)
and then, based on more generalised
findings from existing research on civil
war settlements, extrapolate a possible
trajectory for Syria. Special attention is
given to the opportunities that the West
and its regional partners now have to
work with those non-regime forces which
are politically, militarily and territorially
more consolidated.
The starting point of the discussion,
therefore, is that the contraction of the
Assad regime seems to have been halted
and its imminent defeat is unlikely. The
regime has recovered and is now likely
to co-exist with a diverse and sometimes
opportunistic alliance of rebel groups,
with differing ethnic, religious and
political bases. Some are local entities,
others are regional or national, backed by
various external patrons whose agendas
on Syria (and beyond) are, individually,
not always coherent and, collectively,
virtually incompatible. Those groups
converge in three areas: the rejection of
Assad and the senior political andmilitary
leadership of his regime; the rejection of
Daesh and Jabhat Al-Nusra as legitimate
players in a future transition; and the
preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity,
rather than a negotiated break-up of
the country into two or more successor
areas.
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In the current environment,
characterised by a patchwork of slowly
stabilising local battlefields across
different front lines (the regime and those
loyal to it versus the rebel opposition
bloc; the regime and those loyal to
it versus Daesh; the rebel opposition
bloc versus Daesh; and the intra-rebel
opposition bloc), it is unlikely that any
of the factions will have such resounding
military dominance on the battlefield
that it will be able to impose its will on
others concerning future governance
arrangements in Syria. Nor is it likely
that any would be able to sustain such
an imposition beyond the short term.
As a consequence, one should expect
some form of a settlement negotiated
primarily among the main rebel factions
and their key external backers. Such a
settlement will need to take account of
five dimensions; and the extent to which
these will be reflected in a balanced
way in the terms of the settlement
will determine its sustainability. They
include: the ethnic, religious/sectarian,
local and political divisions in Syria that
have been hardening over the course of
the civil war since 2011; the ‘un-mixing’
of formerly diverse local communities,
and the consequent flows of internally
displaced persons and refugees; the
intense hatred and desire for revenge, as
well as the deep distrust, between and
within communities in Syria, resulting
from the suffering endured during more
than five years of civil war in which more
than 400,000 people have been killed,
more than 11 million displaced and more
than 4.8 million have become refugees
in neighbouring countries; the economic
and humanitarian devastation of the
country; and the regional, cross-border,
and transnational ethnic, religious and
sectarian alliances in which the Syrian
civil war is embedded.
Given both the complexity of the
constellation of actors in the Syrian civil
war and of the issues at stake, existing
research on civil war settlements
27
suggests that the most likely settlement
will have three main characteristics. First,
it will be rigid, with a predetermined
composition of key transitional
governance institutions and a territorial
re-organisation of the state reflecting
both the balance of power and the extent
of spatial control by different factions
in the winning alliance at the time of a
ceasefire or settlement. Second, it will
be hybrid, reflecting pre-existing local,
political, territorial and demographic
realities on the ground. Third, it will
be ambiguous, leaving significant
room for competing and conflicting
interpretations of settlement provisions
and implementation procedures.
In other words, a viable negotiated
agreement is likely to combine weak
power-sharing arrangements at the
centre with a multipolar and hybrid
territorial system of self-governance
that will usher in a tense and contested
transition period, with the aim of
achieving a more permanent set of
arrangements.
28
In light of recent experiences of
post-civil war transitions, it is possible
to envisage four ‘models’ or pathways.
The first is the (pre-2015) Yemen
model: a parallel (pre-)transition
period characterised by a transitional
government of national unity alongside
a national dialogue, followed by a
constitutional drafting process, all
overseen and facilitated by the UN.
29
The second is the Bosnia model: a
UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation
overseeing the implementation of
a constitution agreed as part of a
comprehensive peace agreement.
30
The
third is the Iraq model: the drafting and
implementation of a constitution under
military occupation.
31
The fourth is the
Libya model: a rapidly disintegrating,
domestically led process of post-conflict
state-building.
32
Of these four models, the Libya
model is clearly undesirable, while
the Iraq and Bosnia models are, to
different degrees, unlikely as there is
at this stage no realistic expectation of
the necessary military footprint in Syria
that would accompany either of these
models. This leaves, realistically, only a
version of the Yemen model. While the
transition process in Yemen is far from
complete and does not, at the moment,
advertise itself as a resounding success
of either international or regional crisis
management, it offers a number of
important insights into how to prepare
for an eventual post-civil war transition
in Syria, providing observers with the
opportunity to identify and potentially
mitigate the likely risks that will be
encountered.
The first question to ask is what can
potentially go wrong in the negotiation
and implementation of a political
settlement. The Yemen model – as
well as other recent experiences from
the Arab uprisings of 2011 (including,
in particular, Egypt and Libya), from
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and the subsequent civil
war in post-independence South Sudan,
from Afghanistan and Iraq, and from
earlier conflict and crisis management
experiences in the Western Balkans
and the former Soviet Union – suggests
that there are a number of key risks.
These include: prolonged and eventually
inconclusive peace negotiations after an
initial, but potentially volatile, ceasefire
has been established; a partial and not
fully inclusive agreement, in which
either crucial aspects of post-civil war
governance arrangements are not
covered in sufficient detail or are simply
left for later negotiations; a partial
agreement from which key players are
excluded or subsequently walk away;
a protracted transition period in which
the implementation process stalls;
or transitional arrangements which
eventually become permanent.
All these risks bring with them
the potential of defections from
an agreement and the consequent
possibility of renewed civil war, instigated
by domestic or external actors (possibly
through the creation of new proxy
forces or through more direct forms of
intervention), or by a combination of
both.
Acknowledging these risks is an
important first step towards early
and effective mitigating action. While
there is no guaranteed recipe that
can conclusively and comprehensively
mitigate all of them, there are a number
of steps that can, and should, be taken
now by the international community
to avoid the nightmare scenario of
another Libya and to avoid repeating the
mistakes made in Yemen. Three sets of
considerations should shape the thinking
of the international community in
preparing for a credible and sustainable
post-civil war transition in Syria.
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The first of these is to recognise,
and act upon, the need for flexible,
inclusive and expanding negotiation
formats. This relates to both the
participants and the issues. In terms
of participants, now is the time to
individually and collectively reach out
to, and work with, as many players in
the insurgency as possible at all levels.
This should involve, at a minimum,
discussions with willing parties on a
formal or informal pre-negotiation
agreement that would outline the
principles of and an agenda for
subsequent negotiations. As this process
evolves, more parties can be brought in,
creating a broader and more inclusive
basis of future settlement negotiations
and widening the consensus on its key
principles and agenda items.
In parallel, the West and its
regional partners now also have a
better opportunity to build capacity
within the opposition rebel bloc, which
in turn can also help to overcome initial
reluctance and persuade individual
players to engage with a more
established negotiation format. At the
same time, such a process can sensitise
international mediators and facilitators
to the degree to which specific issues
are particularly contested. It can further
help them to shape an agenda for future
negotiations that is sequenced in such
a way that a breakdown of negotiations
can be avoided and allow them to draw
up contingency plans if negotiations stall
over certain issues. It is also conceivable
to imagine that NGOs currently engaged
in humanitarian relief efforts could
play a significant role in this process,
especially as far as capacity-building at
the local level is concerned. This needs
to happen in such a way that it does not
jeopardise their primary role, providing
humanitarian relief; that it responds to
local demand, instead of being driven
solely by international conceptions
of assistance; that it contributes to
the involvement of civil society actors
and organisations and prevents the
monopolisation of the process by
military and political elites; and that it
enables a level of co-ordination with the
international community that does not
run counter to the long-term feasibility
and viability of a political settlement.
The second set of considerations
derives from the localised nature of the
anti-Assad coalition and of non-regime
forces more widely. It concerns the
need to integrate top-down and
bottom-up approaches in managing the
transition process. On the one hand, any
potentially sustainable settlement will
need to reflect the military, political,
economic and demographic realities in
and beyond Syria. On the other hand,
international efforts need to consider,
shape and leverage local deals being
made now, including assessing the
impact of emerging local arrangements
on the feasibility of future national-level
structures. These efforts need to shape
such deals wherever possible so that
viable state structures can still emerge
in a broader political settlement, and
also so that they leverage the possibility
and reality of local deals as building
blocks for such a settlement. In all
of this, it will be essential to factor in
the current level of displacement of
people within and beyond Syria, and
the possibility and sustainability of
their return and resettlement. Even
if the current de facto partition of
Syria cannot be overcome in the long
term, addressing displacement would
contribute to stability and security
within and between each of the entities
and thus reduce the likelihood of a later
resurgence in violence. Critical to this
would be the management of still-highly
contested spaces like the divided city of
Aleppo or the suburbs of Damascus.
The third and final set of
considerations concerns the
sustainability of the transition process
as a means of both establishing and
preserving peace and stability within
and beyond Syria and of (re)building
the social, political and economic
foundations of a viable state in a
situation in which local capacity to
do so is in short supply, trust across
communities is very low, and divisions
are deep and entrenched. Consequently,
careful consideration needs to be given
to the use of settlement guarantees at
different levels (local, national, regional,
global) and across different sectors
(political, economic, military). Such
guarantees should be tied to incentives
for the various Syrian parties (and
their external backers as appropriate)
so that they limit the extent and
impact of potential defections from
the agreement. Equally importantly,
now is the time to think about how the
implementation of any future agreement
can be sequenced such that all parties
will remain committed to it.
Beyond Governance
Arrangements: Addressing the
Conflict’s Legacy
One of the key destabilising factors during
and after any post-civil war transition
period is the impact of the conflict’s
legacy on efforts to rebuild viable states
and societies.
33
Transitional justice
programming is meant to address such
issues, but it is in itself a highly contested
area of academic and policy debate.
Moreover, it is one that intersects closely
with state-building efforts inasmuch
as rules of the post-war political game
are likely to determine what is possible
in terms of transitional justice and vice
versa. Those who negotiate peace and
future governance arrangements are
likely to be guided as much by their own
personal interests as by those of the
communities they claim to represent;
and are unlikely to volunteer for custodial
sentences or for exclusion from positions
of influence because of crimes and
atrocities they committed.
Though little can meaningfully be
planned to address atrocities and the
conflict’s legacy until the conditions
for moving forward are understood,
three main points stand out. First, if
a transitional justice strategy is not to
become isolated and meaningless, it
will need to be embedded in existing
networks, able to utilise them and current
actors. This means confronting morally
complex terrain. Second, the Syrian
transition may well force the underlying
assumptions and implementation
mechanisms of transitional justice to
be rethought; that is, the transition
process may have the potential to
‘reshape’ transitional justice. Third, and
related, transitional justice cannot be
disengaged from local processes. Donors
and international advisers must plan their
strategies, and learn from past errors.
The Syrian conflict has not left completely
clear lines between insurgent groups,
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non-militant organisations and civil
society actors. With the militarisation of
the conflict, actors that have arisen out
of insurgency groups have often eclipsed
those who have emerged from civil
society, and in some cases they have been
connected with one another. Because
many activists have been killed, detained
or forced to flee Syria, the initial force for
reconstruction in ‘liberated’ areas is the
leadership of rebel units. A decimated
civil society also provokes questions
about what capacity it may have to build
or deepen local democratic structures.
Rebuilding civil society structures and
addressing the deep divisions within
communities will take some time.
The experience of Ahrar Al-Sham,
the largest faction in the rebellion,
provides an interesting illustration of
the issues that any transitional justice
process will have to address. Making
savvy use of social media, public relations
and outreach strategies, Ahrar Al-Sham
has rebranded itself,
34
moving from an
organisation with links to Jabhat Al-Nusra
to a mainstream Syrian opposition group
that calls for ‘a national unifying project’ –
one that, in the words of its international
spokesman Labib Al-Nahhas, ‘should
not be bound to a single ideology’. It
has broad internal networks across the
spectrum of actors as well as good access
to international media. Its 2015 articles
in the Washington Post and the Daily
Telegraph have demonstrated this new
hybrid and its power.
35
Looking ahead, it is possible that
actors like Ahrar Al-Sham, and other
groups (or their offshoots) that become
increasingly ‘moderate’ as they are
gradually incorporated into a peace
process, will form the foundations
of transitional justice work. They will
certainly have an opinion on it and
they will have access to media that will
enable them to communicate those
opinions. With these dynamics, a primary
challenge will be ensuring that the
process does not become a whitewashing
of past crimes, nor a public relations
tool for groups with one leg in militant
camps and another in peace-building
processes. Civil society organisations
and humanitarian actors with pre-existing
networks on the ground are likely to
be key allies in any transitional justice
process. Groups such as the Syrian
Justice and Accountability Centre, the
Local Coordination Committees, the
Violations Documentation Center, the
Foundation to Restore Equality and
Education in Syria, the Syrian Network
for Human Rights, together with lawyers
and activists, amongst others, have
been involved in some of the most
sophisticated, innovative and strategic
documentation efforts that have ever
existed during a conflict. A number of
human rights actors have conducted
steady and consistent work collecting,
documenting and mapping evidence of
human rights violations. The resulting
repository of data is not only being used
to track the scale of human and material
loss, but is likely to form the backbone
of any (unlikely) prosecutions and (more
likely) reparations and reform processes.
These organisations are likely to be
ready to begin their work ‘day one’ after
a settlement. In other words, the most
relevant work regarding accountability
for conflict-related atrocities in Syria
will probably come from activists
within local communities and from
leading social media campaigns. Local
councils operating in non-Assad parts
of Syria, supported by a network of
civil society organisations, are already
dealing with issues of criminal justice
and the radicalisation of local youth
with micro-empowerment programmes
and vocational training. These are likely
to be the voices that shape practical
thinking about dealing with the legacies
of conflict-related violence.
Yet an important caveat also applies
here: civil society actors have largely
been marked by the same divisions
as the rest of the conflict parties and
are likely to be involved in the same
internecine conflicts, an involvement
that will probably become increasingly
apparent as discussions around
transitional justice begin in earnest. As
regional and international organisations,
foreign governments and their associated
donor and development agencies start
to think about post-civil war options for
transitional justice, they should bear
in mind a number of broader lessons
to be learnt from other experiences of
dealing with the legacy of conflict-related
violence.
First, it will be important to think
from the outset about a meaningful role
for civil society in any transitional justice
processes. Donor states should support
the inclusion of civil society organisations
at the initial planning stage. Moreover,
human rights organisations should
keep pressure on donors to remember
that civil society organisations are key
vectors for the construction of networks,
social trust and, ultimately, social
cohesion. The corollary of this is that
adequate funding should be allocated
from the outset for civil society actors.
Past experiences indicate that very few
resources were allocated to such actors
during transitional justice programming,
a shortcoming which both significantly
inhibits their ability to foster meaningful
change and also hinders the objectives
of transitional justice programming.
36
The inclusion of civil society perspectives
in initial decision-making processes
often improves long-term collaboration
between civil society and the state, and
can assist in the establishment of civil
society actors as legitimate partners with
(or counterweights to) the state. It will be
important to allow time for civil society to
rebuild its internal relationships. It is also
important not to rush that process for the
sake of keeping to an externally imposed
timeframe or roadmap.
37
Following from this, donors will
need to think very carefully about funding
ratios among different transitional
justice initiatives. The allocation of
funding is notoriously lopsided and this
has damaged holistic approaches to
transitional justice in the past. Including
civil society actors in the process of
donor and government prioritisation and
strategy-setting from the beginning can
ensure that the needs of stakeholders
and relevant communities are reflected
in national policies.
Equally, as discussions move towards
truth-telling and truth-seeking, the
process needs to be genuinely inclusive,
and not rushed by external actors and
timelines. The processes of truth-seeking
are often inherently as important as – or
sometimes more important than – any
final report. This is particularly so when
divisions are as deep as those in Syria.
Donors also need to develop a
transitional justice strategy, rather
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than funding discrete and unconnected
projects. The strongest engagements
with transitional justice processes
have been those that foresaw a long-
term commitment and responded
appropriately to evolving needs.
However, this approach needs vision,
planning, sustained engagement and
commitment, as well as flexibility. Finally,
just as the conflict has lasted much
longer than many people predicted, so
recovery will similarly take more time
than expected. Dealing with the conflict’s
legacy will be a multigenerational
exercise. It will take time, it will suffer
political setbacks, and it will require an
awareness that there will be highs and
lows. Long-term commitment will be
necessary to overcome cycles of conflict
and atrocity.
38
Conclusion
With the partition of Syria now a reality,
and likely to remain so for at least the
foreseeable future, a clearer strategy is
needed to facilitate a gradual transition
to a post-civil war order in which Assad
and his inner circle may or may not
have a permanent place. The space
in the northwest of the country – and
potentially the south, depending on
military and political developments –
needs to be consolidated and further
legitimised. This needs to happen locally
through the further development of local
governance structures, including public
service and judicial systems. Nationally,
it requires the continuation of the
negotiation process within and among
the different factions in the civil war.
Regionally and globally, efforts need to
continue to protect non-regime spaces,
to push back Daesh and Jabhat Al-Nusra,
and to work towards a permanent and
stable ceasefire between them that can
be part of a post-civil war transition.
In those areas controlled by the
opposition rebel bloc and the Kurdish
forces, the West and its regional partners
need to support nascent local efforts to
meet the immediate challenges. These
include the provision of food, shelter
and basic goods for both residents and
the many displaced Syrians in the region;
the creation of inclusive governance
institutions; and the establishment of a
legal system that follows due process and
recognises legal rights.
International support for
functioning governance needs to be
seen as the beginning of a long process
leading towards a de-escalation and
resolution of the Syrian crisis, rather
than as its endpoint. Pursued carefully,
it can contribute to: establishing working
relationships between the West, its
regional partners and groups that have
consolidated their presence in Syrian
communities; consolidating a minimal
political consensus among factions
participating in the High Negotiations
Committee; developing a more realistic
and coherent approach to the Syrian
crisis that is broadly shared by the
West and its regional allies and thus
renewing relations between those
allies, including France, Turkey and the
Gulf States, all of whom have expressed
frustration with indecision inherent to
and incoherence of US and British policy;
offering an alternative to the long-term
prospect of a protracted civil war and
the consolidation and possible further
expansion of territorial control by Daesh;
and starting a process to assist in dealing
with the ever-worsening humanitarian
crisis.
This is by no means an optimal
solution to the Syrian conflict, but there
is no ‘optimal solution’ in the current
situation because there is no single
country, no single external coalition, no
single strategy and no single anti-regime
force. The rebels are consolidating their
de facto state in the northwest. With the
backing of Russia, Iran and Hizbullah,
the Assad (or other Alawite-dominated
successor) regime is almost certain
to hold onto its heartland from the
Mediterranean and Lebanese borders
through Homs to Damascus. For their
part, the Kurds are unlikely to give up
their territorial gains or their vision of a
federal Syria as a model for the future.
The political, legal and social
development of opposition and Kurdish-
held areas protected by a viable and
externally guaranteed ceasefire is
therefore themost productive approach. It
provides for legitimacy and responsibility,
while also addressing those issues that
fed the uprising as well as encouraging
groups with disparate viewpoints to seek
progress through dialogue rather than
confrontation. The establishment of
governance and the provision of justice
not only provides a counter to the Assad
regime. It also confirms the existence
of alternatives to Daesh. Eventually, it
allows groups to be distinguished from
factions such as Jabhat Al-Nusra. Finally,
if Assad should happen to fall quickly, as
Muammar Qadhafi did in Libya, or slowly
and inconclusively, as Ali Abdullah Saleh
did in Yemen, then the provision of that
alternative could mitigate some of the
violence and political instability that have
marred the aftermaths of other ‘Arab
Spring’ revolutions.
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